How does petty corruption affect tax morale in Sub-Saharan Africa? by Jahnke, B & Weisser, RA
European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2018) 1–17Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejpeHow does petty corruption affect tax morale in
Sub-Saharan Africa?
Bj€orn Jahnke a,*, Reinhard A. Weisser b
a Leibniz University Hannover, Institute of Economic Policy, Koenigsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany
bQueen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, Mile End Road, E1 4NS, London, United KingdomA R T I C L E I N F O
JEL classiﬁcation:
D73
H26
K42
Keywords:
Corruption
Tax morale
Effect heterogeneity
Mediation analysis* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jahnke@glad.uni-hannover.de (B. Ja
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.09.003
Received 2 September 2017; Received in revised form 1
Available online xxxx
0176-2680/© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is a
Please cite this article in press as: Jahnke, B
European Journal of Political Economy (201A B S T R A C T
Revenues from taxation gain in importance to ﬁnance economic development in Sub-Saharan
Africa. One obstacle to enhancing the willingness to remit taxes can be the extortion of bribes
by public ofﬁcials. Using micro-level data from the Afrobarometer, we show that petty corruption
erodes tax morale. The effect on tax morale is more severe in countries and regions where fewer
people are affected by petty corruption and becomes insigniﬁcant if extortion of bribes is
particularly prevalent. Differing levels of civic participation and potential access to tax funded
services are also found to induce heterogeneous reactions to corruption experience. Applying a
mediation analysis, we demonstrate that petty corruption not only has a direct effect on tax morale
but also diminishes conﬁdence in tax authorities and therefore affects tax morale indirectly. The
harmful effects of corruption experience, however, operate mainly through a generally lowered
inclination to uphold high levels of tax morale.1. Introduction
Tax morale has gained in importance in the context of recent reforms in tax systems in many Sub-Saharan African countries as they
attempt to improve their ﬁscal capacity. Declarations of taxable income increasingly depend on voluntary compliance and self-
assessment by the taxpayers (Fossat and Bua, 2013; Moore, 2014). This shift implies a signiﬁcant change in the relationship between
taxpayers and the state. Increased autonomy of taxpayers enhances the relevance of their motivation to cooperate with the government
and pay taxes.
Besley and Persson (2013) provide theoretical arguments how corruption can be an obstacle to the emergence of tax compliance
norms in developing countries, and thus, they provide a reason as to why developing countries may have lower tax revenues. Corruption
can take on different forms. One form is petty corruption, deﬁned as the “everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level
public ofﬁcials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services” (Transparency In-
ternational, 2016). Given the fact that petty corruption is pervasive in many Sub-Saharan African countries (Transparency International,
2013) and related to reduced trust in public institutions (Lavallee et al., 2008), it is still an open question how these phenomena are
related to individual tax morale.
The literature on the nexus of tax morale and corruption so far either focuses on Transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (Torgler, 2006) or perceived trust in the tax department (Ali et al., 2014). In contrast, we provide a detailed mirco-level inves-
tigation of the interrelation of individual petty corruption experience and tax morale. Our focus rests on 29 Sub-Saharan Africanhnke).
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effect strength depends on the spread of corruption across various domains of daily life and the frequency of corruption an individual
encounters in a given domain. Furthermore, we investigate in which domains corruption experiences are especially harmful with respect
to tax morale.
We conduct a mediation analysis to suggest a mechanism how individual corruption experience might impact on tax morale. Within
this approach, we can ﬁrst demonstrate that lower levels of conﬁdence in tax authorities are plausibly associated to lower tax morale.
Diminished conﬁdence in tax authorities, in turn, can be explained by corruption experience. Ultimately, this mediation analysis allows
to separate the direct and the indirect effect of petty corruption experience, via conﬁdence in tax authorities, and to quantify the effects'
relative impact.
As part of our heterogeneity analysis we re-estimate our baseline results, but allow for effect heterogeneity across groups. More
precisely, we ask whether varying levels of civic participation or access to public servicesmight translate into varying degrees of sensitivity
with respect to corruption experience. We ﬁnd notable differences across groups, especially related to regular news consumption and
being part of a societal majority. We subject our results to a number of sensitivity analyses, such as controlling for various levels of
geographic ﬁxed effects and corruption exposure levels. Moreover, we also account for historical levels of corruption exposure which
might be indicative of habituation to a speciﬁc corruption level. By applying a pseudo-panel approach to the repeated cross-sectional
data, we can conﬁrm our basic results with respect to spread and frequency of corruption experiences.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the
data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 analyses the basic relationship between petty corruption and tax morale. Section 5 encompasses
our heterogeneity and sensitivity analyses. Section 6 introduces the mediation analysis as an approach to disaggregate the total effect of
petty corruption on tax morale. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Tax morale
The concept of tax morale evolved from the economic analysis of tax evasion. This strand of literature was pioneered by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972), who interpreted cheating on taxes as a risky decision within an expected utility model. Eventually, they
demonstrate that the concealed amount of income is negatively related to the audit and penalty structure. Later studies showed that the
actual tax compliance is much higher than predicted by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Alm et al. (1992) demonstrate that the relative
risk aversion must be extraordinarily high to explain actual tax compliance, given that actual audit probabilities and costs of detection
are very low even in industrialized countries. Baldry (1986) conducts experiments and invites participants to consider tax evasion as a
gamble. Many players do not evade taxes despite the invitation. Taxpayers seem to incur moral costs from feelings of guilt or shame,
which shape the intrinsic motivation to comply, and thus, tax morale. Smith (1992) argues that tax compliance is shaped not only by
intrinsic motivation but also by extrinsic factors. He emphasizes that the perceived fairness of the tax system and the reliability of the
political system affect the motivation to comply with taxes.
2.2. Corruption and tax morale
Corruption in public authorities can severely harm tax morale. From a theoretical point of view, corruption can discourage people to
comply because of perceived unfairness in the exchange between taxpayers and the state (Feld and Frey, 2007) and induce vertical
inequities from additional monetary burdening (Fortin et al., 2007). Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) indicate that bribery distorts the
price mechanism and erodes government legitimacy. Torgler (2003) shows that taxpayers are more likely to comply if they feel fairly
treated by the government. Torgler (2006) argues that countries with high levels of corruption lack the social norm of paying taxes to the
government. He ﬁnds that Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is negatively correlated with tax morale. Ali et al.
(2014) analyse the impact of satisfaction with public services on tax morale of individuals in four Sub-Saharan African countries. The
authors use the perceived number of corrupt tax ofﬁcials as proxy for citizens' satisfaction with the tax administration. Their study ﬁnds
signiﬁcant negative effects on tax morale in Uganda and South Africa, but not in Kenya and Tanzania.
2.3. Petty corruption and trust in public institutions
Although the inﬂuence and extent of perceived corruption has been widely studied in the literature, only few studies focus on the
impact of actual petty corruption payments. Cho and Kirwin (2007) show that petty corruption reduces trust in public institutions and
that petty corruption can induce a vicious circle. Prevalent corruption increases the expectations of bribe offers and thus increases the
frequency of petty corruption experiences. Clausen et al. (2011) use data from the Gallup World Poll to prove the causality of petty
corruption experiences for reduced trust in institutions. They estimate that effects from reduced trust in institutions need to be very high
to reverse the direction of the effects from petty corruption. Lavallee et al. (2008) use data from the Afrobarometer to test the efﬁcient
grease hypothesis. They point out that higher corruption never increases trust in public institutions. This relates to the argument by
Fisman and Golden (2017) who stress the importance of the origins of laws for the appraisal of positive effects from bribery. The authors
indicate that bad laws are implemented in the interest of politicians attracting bribe payments in order to circumvent government
regulations. Lavallee et al. (2008) further ﬁnd different effects of perceived and experienced corruption on trust in public institutions.
First, the negative effect from perceived corruption is more severe the higher the satisfaction with public services. Second, the negative2
Fig. 1. Tax morale (round 5).
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individuals are more concerned about petty corruption if it is an obstacle to get access to public services.2.4. Corruption in tax departments
Corruption in tax departments plays an important role to explain lower tax revenues. Tax ofﬁcials are in a position to extort bribes,
collude with taxpayers, and embezzle public revenues (cf. Martini, 2014). Transparency International (2013) estimates that bribe
payments to tax ofﬁcials is particularly prevalent in some African countries. More than 60 per cent of individuals in Sierra Leone and
Liberia reported having paid bribes to tax ofﬁcials in 2013 as opposed to the global average of 15 per cent. Aiko and Logan (2014)
highlight that individuals are aware of widespread corruption in tax departments: 35 per cent of respondents to the Afrobarometer
believe that the majority of tax ofﬁcials are involved in corruption. Alm et al. (2016) demonstrate that corruption-related payments -
either voluntarily offered to or extorted by corrupt tax ofﬁcials - signiﬁcantly reduce reported sales and hence ﬁrms' tax payments.
Positive experiences with Eastern European tax departments, in turn, can improve the intrinsic motivation to comply and even
encourage the report of past non-compliance (Kasper, 2016).2.5. Corruption and social norms
The speciﬁc effects of corruption on individual behaviour are discussed in the literature on social norms. Hauk and Saez-Marti (2001)
argue that small-scale corruption is not necessarily considered negative in public opinion. Banuri and Eckel (2012) state that corruption
norms constitute speciﬁc types of social norms and determine the expectations of individuals regarding the extent of corruption.
Cameron et al. (2009) analyse corruption behaviour and attitudes of students from low-corruption countries and high-corruption
countries. They ﬁnd that more tolerant attitudes towards corruption can be explained by more prevalent corruption in their coun-
tries of origin. Byrne et al. (2010) argue that everyday corruption can become normalized. The authors highlight the role of the media to
make people aware of injustice and mobilise opposition. Case studies on Uganda and Tanzania show that institutionalisation and
normalisation of corruption can be observed in Sub-Saharan Africa as well (Panth, 2011; Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002).
3. Descriptive statistics of main variables
Our main analysis draws upon data from Afrobarometer (2016, round 5), which was carried out from 2011 to 2013 in 33 African3
Fig. 2. Corruption experience in various domains.
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respondents who are at least 18 years of age. The baseline sample of the included Sub-Saharan countries encompasses 45,598 persons.
Due to missing data, the sample size decreases by approximately 10 per cent in most of our estimations. The countries included in this
paper are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Co^te d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Our main dependent variable is tax morale, based on question 76B from the Afrobarometer: ‘I am now going to ask you about a range
of different actions that some people take. For each of the following, please tell me whether you think the action is not wrong at all,
wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable: Not paying the taxes they owe on their income.’ In the full sample, approximately
50% of the respondents declare that not paying the taxes was wrong and punishable (Fig. 1).
For most of our estimations, we rely on a binary version of the dependent variable. A value of 1 captures that the respondents
consider not paying taxes as wrong and punishable (high tax morale), and 0 if they consider it as wrong but understandable or not wrong
at all (low tax morale). As presented in Appendix Fig. A2, tax morale varies between the Sub-Saharan countries. Respondents in Malawi
and Uganda exhibit the highest tolerance for non-compliant taxpayers whereas around two-thirds of the respondents in Burundi,
Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, Mali and Niger answered that cheating on taxes is wrong and punishable.
Using such an indirect question to evaluate individual tax morale has become standard in the literature on tax morale (Ali et al.,
2014; Frey and Torgler, 2007; McGee, 2008). Some scholars questioned the reliability of this proxy and argued that it might not reﬂect
actual behaviour (e.g. Elffers et al., 1987).2 Torgler et al. (2010), however, show a robust correlation between the indirectly measured
tax morale and the actual level of tax evasion. Halla (2012) provides evidence for a causal link between tax morale and actual tax
compliance.
With respect to our main explanatory variable, i.e. overall corruption experience, the survey includes several questions eliciting bribe
experiences in various daily life situations. These items refer to the above deﬁnition of petty corruption. Question 61 from the Afro-
barometer asks whether respondents had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government ofﬁcials in order to get a document or a
permit, water or sanitation services, treatment at a local health clinic or hospital, a place in primary school or to avoid problems with the
police. The survey offers four possible answers: never, once or twice, a few times, or often. Fig. 2 illustrates the shares of respondents
who were confronted with petty corruption in the previous year, irrespective of the frequency. In particular, paying bribes or offering
gifts is necessary to get documents, access to health services or to avoid problems with the police.
Based on the various forms of petty corruption we derive three distinct aggregate measures of corruption experience: The ﬁrst is a
binary indicator (corruption experience) which is set to one whenever a respondent made a corruption experience in any of the ﬁve
domains. As presented in Appendix Fig. A2, and aside from Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Namibia, corruption experiences are
quite prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The second indicator (spread of corruption) reﬂects the number of domains (zero to ﬁve) in which a respondent encountered cor-
ruption. The third measure (corruption frequency) documents the most frequent exposure to corruption in any of the ﬁve domains. Due to
the bribe experience elicitation, we cannot construct an indicator summing up the exact frequency of corruption experience across the
domains in any meaningful manner.
Within our main analysis, we also control for the following set of socio-demographic characteristics (X, see Appendix Table A1):
gender, age, employment status, educational attainment, and urban residence. As the Afrobarometer survey does not provide infor-
mation about the income of the respondents, we follow the approach by Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014) and construct an index of lived
poverty. This poverty indicator reﬂects how frequently respondents have been deprived of food, water, medical care, cooking fuel and1 In our heterogeneity and sensitivity analyses we also integrate data from rounds 2 to 4.
2 For this reason, we also run auxiliary estimations with an alternative dependent variable, which relates to the legitimacy of enforcing tax payments.
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Table 1
Tax morale and corruption experiences.
Average marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Petty corruption experience 0.0323*** (0.0057) 0.0305*** (0.0057) 0.0396*** (0.0052) 0.0507*** (0.0052)
Socio-demographic controls
Female 0.0256*** (0.0050) 0.0237*** (0.0048) 0.0230*** (0.0045) 0.0189*** (0.0044)
Age 0.0011*** (0.0002) 0.0011*** (0.0002) 0.0010*** (0.0002) 0.0003* (0.0002)
Education
High 0.0525*** (0.0113) 0.0541*** (0.0112) 0.0591*** (0.0103) 0.0400*** (0.0099)
Medium 0.0286*** (0.0059) 0.0269*** (0.0058) 0.0312*** (0.0053) 0.0314*** (0.0052)
Self-employed 0.0325*** (0.0054) 0.0241*** (0.0055) 0.0260*** (0.0049) 0.0069 (0.0048)
Urban 0.0184*** (0.0055) 0.0154***(0.0063) 0.0234*** (0.0050) 0.0224*** (0.0049)
Poverty 0.0168*** (0.0017) 0.0184*** (0.0017) 0.0166*** (0.0015) 0.0106*** (0.0015)
Country FE Yes No Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes No No
N 39,561 39,561 39,561 39,979
Pseudo R2 0.0455 0.0858 0.0401 0.0384
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale (ﬁrst three columns) and tax legitimacy (fourth column). The variable is binary coded in columns 1, 2 and 4, such that 1 refers
to the highest levels of tax morale (or tax legitimacy) and 0 comprises intermediate and low levels of tax morale. In column 3, the original ordinal scale of the dependent
variable (not paying taxes is wrong at all, wrong but understandable, wrong and punishable) is maintained. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sig-
niﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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4. Tax morale and corruption experiences
4.1. Baseline model
As discussed in the literature section, corruption could harm tax morale through various channels, e.g. as reaction related to
perceived unfairness in ﬁscal exchange or siphoning resources off. In our analysis, we ﬁrst establish a general relationship between tax
morale and individual corruption experience and later investigate a potential mechanism. The general relationship is based on the
following estimation equation:
PðΤ i ¼ highÞ ¼ ΦðβCorruptioni þ γXi þ τiÞ (1)
With Φ as standard normal cumulative density function, the Probit model represented in equation (1) estimates the probability that
individual i displays a high level of taxmorale (Τ). Controlling for socio-demographic characteristics Xi the coefﬁcient estimate β informs
then about the interrelation of individual corruption experience and tax morale. We recognise that there might exist a number of un-
observed factors which could be correlated with both corruption experience and tax morale, introducing bias to our estimate of β. Likely
candidates are aspects of local governance, administrative procedures, cultural norms or habituation. We address this concern in more
detail in our sensitivity analysis (section 5) and by introducing geographic ﬁxed effects τi. In order to highlight the robustness of our
ﬁndings, we apply two different sets of geographic ﬁxed effects: one captures unobserved confounding factors at the country level, the
second addresses potentially omitted regional factors.4
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 present average marginal effects (AME) of the impact of petty corruption experiences (binary
measure) on tax morale. The ﬁrst column refers to our baseline Probit estimation with country-level FE; the second column contains
average marginal effects from the model with region-level FE. Since the underlying tax morale item was elicited with three outcomes
categories, we also estimated an ordered Probit model (column 3) to account for the ordinal nature of responses. In contrast to the ﬁrst
three columns, the last documents results from an estimation where the dependent variable refers to tax legitimacy. This variable also
implies legal consequences for non-compliance with tax regulations and is based on an alternative item (48C) asking: ‘For each of the
following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree? The tax authorities always have the right to make people pay taxes’.
A high level of tax legitimacy is inferred when respondents (strongly) agree.
The derived marginal effects indicate that corruption experiences have a signiﬁcantly negative effect at the 1 per cent signiﬁcance
level. Corruption experiences during the last year reduce the probability of exhibiting the highest level of tax morale by about 3 per-
centage points. The signiﬁcantly negative effect persists across different speciﬁcations. In contrast to other studies (Ali et al., 2014; Frey
and Torgler, 2007), women exhibit lower tax morale than males. Moreover, less deprived (less poor) people and those with high ed-
ucation attainments have relatively higher tax morale whereas those who are self-employed are signiﬁcantly less likely to uphold the3 We base our index on binary variables, indicating whether individuals had been deprived in any of these dimension, regardless the frequency.
4 The factual power and the administrative level of regions across countries might vary notably (a region in one country might be considered a province in another or
a larger district in a third country). Also, unambiguous legislative power, e.g. with respect to taxes, will prevail on the national level. Since our results from the country-
and the region-level FE speciﬁcations are highly comparable, we will not always present region-level FE results.
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Table 2
Tax morale and petty corruption prevalence.
(1) spread of corruption (2) corruption frequency (3) domain-speciﬁc corruption experience
No. of domains with corruption experience
One 0.0149**(0.0074)
Two 0.0421***(0.0096)
Three 0.0558***(0.0123)
Four 0.0691***(0.0157)
Five (all) 0.0312*(0.0173)
Highest corruption frequency in any domain
Once or twice 0.0221*** (0.0075)
A few times 0.0513*** (0.0088)
Often 0.0276*** (0.0096)
Bribe paid to
Get document or permit 0.0068 (0.0080)
Get water/sanitation service 0.0248** (0.0105)
Get health treatment 0.0076 (0.0085)
Avoid problem with police 0.0312*** (0.0082)
Get place in primary school 0.0197** (0.0097)
Socio-demographic controls
Female 0.0259*** (0.0050) 0.0256*** (0.0050) 0.0256*** (0.0050)
Age 0.0011*** (0.0002) 0.0011*** (0.0002) 0.0011*** (0.0002)
Education
High 0.0535*** (0.0113) 0.0526*** (0.0113) 0.0521*** (0.0114)
Medium 0.0289*** (0.0059) 0.0287*** (0.0059) 0.0280*** (0.0059)
Self-employed 0.0323*** (0.0054) 0.0326*** (0.0055) 0.0324*** (0.0054)
Urban 0.0188*** (0.0055) 0.0184*** (0.0055) 0.0188*** (0.0055)
Poverty 0.0164*** (0.0017) 0.0167*** (0.0017) 0.0165*** (0.0017)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 39,561 39,561 39,561
Pseudo R2 0.0458 0.0456 0.0458
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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size of the negative effect is only slightly higher if an ordered Probit model is employed.5 Finally, our estimations are robust to
employing the alternative dependent variable (tax legitimacy). Having paid a bribe in order to get access to public services reduces the
probability of agreeing that the tax authorities always have the right to make people pay taxes, and thus accepting tax legitimacy, by 5
percentage points.
4.2. Corruption prevalence
In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the relationship between corruption and tax morale, we substitute the binary
aggregate corruption experience measure from the baseline model by more speciﬁc corruption measures. The ﬁrst, spread of corruption,
accounts for the number of domains (zero to ﬁve) in which respondents faced corruption. With ﬁve domains elicited in Afrobarometer
round 5, a value of two would imply that corruption was spread across 40% of the domains of daily life a respondent encountered.
Corruption frequency, on the other hand, reﬂects the most severe prevalence of corruption in any of the ﬁve domains (never, once or
twice, a few times, often). We also re-estimate the baseline model after we substituted the aggregate binary corruption experience
measure by domain-speciﬁc corruptions experiences. Due to their binary nature, we can directly infer whether corruption experiences in
some domain might have more severe repercussions than comparable experiences in other domains.
The estimates in Table 2 (column 1) indicate that the relationship between the spread of corruption and tax morale is negative, but
non-monotonic6: The strongest effects can be observed if individuals encountered corruption in three or four of the ﬁve included do-
mains of daily life. If a respondent encountered corruption in four out of ﬁve domains, the probability that this respondent displays a
high level of tax morale is reduced by 6.9 percentage points, compared to someone with no corruption experience. We further tested
whether the severity of the effect on tax morale is affected by the frequency of bribe experiences across domains (column 2). The results
show that having paid a bribe a few times is related to a higher effect on tax morale (5.1 percentage points) than having paid a bribe
only once or twice (2.2 percentage points), this differences is also highly signiﬁcant. On the other hand, the effect from having paid a
bribe often (2.8 percentage points) is not signiﬁcantly higher than having paid a bribe once or twice, but signiﬁcantly lower than
compared to intermediate corruption frequency.
We also ﬁnd that respondents feature different sensitivities to corruption across the ﬁve domains (column 3): Bribes paid to
circumvent problems with the police reduce the probability of reporting the highest level of tax morale by 3.1 percentage points and5 We also re-run the ordered Probit model, relaxing the parallel line assumptions (Williams, 2006). The resulting petty corruption experience effect was 0.032.
6 Applying Wald tests to asses AME differences support our claim: AMEs for intermediate levels of spread of corruption are also signiﬁcantly different from the AME
for corruption experience in only one domain. The same holds for a comparison of the AMEs in case of the two highest levels of spread of corruption.
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Table 3
Tax morale and general exposure to corruption.
Model Country-level Region-level
Linear Quadratic Linear quadratic
Petty corruption experience 0.0342***(0.0060) 0.0330***(0.0062) 0.0330***(0.061) 0.0348***(0.0064)
Corruption exposure 1.1826***(0.1296) 1.1735***(0.1303) 0.0345 (0.0263) 0.0382 (0.0314)
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 39,561 39,561 39,561 39,561
Pseudo R2 0.0455 0.0455 0.0858 0.0858
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale. The set of socio-demographic controls consists of the following variables: gender, age, educational attainment, self-
employment, urban residence and poverty.
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primary school (2 percentage points) diminish the probability of having the highest level of tax morale signiﬁcantly as well.
5. Heterogeneity and sensitivity analyses
The analysis in Section 4 has shown that an increased frequency or spread of bribe payments per individual is associated with
stronger effects on tax morale. This relationship, however, seems to be non-monotonic (Table 2, columns 1 and 2), i.e. reﬂecting
habituation to bribe experience. This ﬁnding is in line with the literature discussed in Section 2, indicating that corruption levels can
have different effects across countries. One strand of the literature argues that corruption can be normalised in highly corrupt countries
and make people more tolerant towards paying bribes. Thus, the perceived fairness in the relationship with the government might be
affected less by everyday experiences with petty corruption. Another strand of the literature ﬁnds that people are more concerned about
bribe payments if it is an obstacle to get access to public services.
In this section, we extend our analysis to account for additional factors which might introduce heterogeneous reactions to corruption
experiences across otherwise similar individuals. Ignoring these factors, some of them potentially correlated with tax morale and
corruption experience, might otherwise introduce bias to our estimates of interest.7 To account for this in a more structured way, we
address recent individual and general exposure to corruption-prone situations. We also account for a more persistent effect of corruption
on tax morale. Eventually, we investigate how access to public services or civic participation might translate into diverging levels of tax
morale.
5.1. Exposure to corruption
We deﬁne exposure to corruption as living in a situation where encountering corruption becomes more likely. We investigate the
impact of exposure to corruption from two analytical perspectives: the ﬁrst focuses on the general level of exposure to corruption, the
second on the individual level.
The general corruption exposure captures an environment in which corruption is a behaviour respondents are accustomed to. We
derive proxies for the general level of corruption exposure (CE) as the average corruption experience we observe on the country and
region level. The resulting measures are bound between zero and one. Assuming a sufﬁcient degree of representativeness, these averages
supply a proxy for the likelihood that any individual in a certain geographic area wouldmake experiences with petty corruption. In order
to examine heterogeneous reactions with respect to the prevailing corruption exposure, we draw upon the following speciﬁcation
PðΤ i ¼ highÞ ¼ Φ
 
β0Corruptioni þ
X2
j¼1
βjCorruptioni  CEij þ
X2
j¼1
δjCEij þ γXi þ τi
!
(2)
Heterogeneity is modelled by the interaction terms of individual corruption experience and general corruption exposure level (CE). If we
impose β2 ¼ δ2 ¼ 0 we have a purely linear interaction setting, otherwise we can trace non-linearities. Results are documented in
Table 3. Controlling for contemporaneous corruption exposure does not change the impact of individual corruption experience on tax
morale. A one percent increase in country-level exposure to corruption is associated to a 1.2 percentage point decline in the likelihood
that an individual displays a high level of tax morale. There is no similar relation between region-level corruption exposure and tax
morale.
Fig. 3 illustrates the average marginal effects of individual bribe experience in various regional-level corruption exposure settings.
Across both the linear and the quadratic interaction speciﬁcation we ﬁnd negative average marginal effects for individual bribe7 In our sensitivity analysis we aim at addressing concerns regarding endogeneity by applying country- and region-level ﬁxed effects and explicitly integrating
potentially relevant, yet previously omitted variables. We do not apply an IV estimation since in the context of tax morale, previously used instruments, such as re-
spondents' overall trust in others, perceptions of the political inﬂuence of ethnic groups, household head is respondent to the survey and the respondent is willing to pay
a bribe (Cho and Kirwin, 2007; Lavallee et al., 2008), do not convincingly fulﬁl the exclusion restriction. We also follow the argument by Clausen et al. (2011) that it is
very unlikely for governmental ofﬁcials to know about each individual's perceived trust in institutions, which could potentially introduce a reverse causality channel.
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Fig. 3. Average marginal effects of petty corruption experience on tax morale.
Table 4
Average marginal effects of domain-speciﬁc corruption experience and exposure.
Access to (1) (2)
YES NO YES NO
Corruption experience to
Get document or permit – 0.008 (0.008) 0.006 (0.008)
Get water/sanitation service Piped water 0.022 (0.015) 0.009 (0.015) 0.007 (0.015) 0.013 (0.015)
Sewage system 0.045**(0.020) 0.006 (0.013) 0.041**(0.019) 0.000 (0.012)
Get health treatment Health clinic 0.004 (0.010) 0.010 (0.013) 0.005 (0.010) 0.006 (0.013)
Avoid problem with police Police station 0.042***(0.013) 0.026**(0.010) 0.036***(0.012) 0.024**(0.010)
Roadblock 0.051*(0.029) 0.031***(0.009) 0.030 (0.029) 0.028***(0.008)
Get place in primary school School 0.021**(0.010) 0.030 (0.030) 0.027***(0.010) 0.036 (0.030)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Region FE No No Yes Yes
N 38,952 38,952
Pseudo R2 0.0465 0.0866
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale. There is no unique authority which can be directly linked to the domain of documents or permits. The reported AME thus
refers to the baseline estimate β0. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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periences, our estimates lose their signiﬁcance. Overall, the adverse effects of individual bribe experience on tax morale may be lower in
a setting with higher general exposure to corruption. Yet, aside from individuals living in regions above the 95th exposure percentile,
there is no complete adaption, i.e. a signiﬁcant negative effect prevails.
Next, we address individual level corruption exposure by focusing on the interaction likelihood between an individual and a
potentially corrupt ofﬁcial. This individual-speciﬁc interaction likelihood is assessed based on items which asked the respondents
whether a domain-speciﬁc facility was in their vicinity.8 Any domain-speciﬁc exposure measure (CEk;i) is coded as zero whenever a
respective service or facility was not in the household's vicinity. It is important to note that this does not imply that a household has no
access at all. Instead, due to a lower accessibility a household would make less frequent use of such a service, and thus, was less likely to
be exposed to a corrupt ofﬁcial.
Our starting point is equation (1) with domain-speciﬁc corruption experiences (Corruptionk;i), yet we augment the model by inter-
acting the k ¼ 5 individual level experiences with individual-domain-speciﬁc exposures8 The survey deﬁnes vicinity as being in the primary sampling unit, the enumeration area or in walking distance. There is, however, no corresponding facility which
can be linked to the domain ‘getting document or permit’. In other cases, there are two plausible individual exposure measures, i.e. police station and police roadblocks.
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Table 5
Average marginal effects of recent experiences and past corruption exposure.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Petty corruption experience 0.032***(0.007) 0.033***(0.007) 0.026***(0.007) 0.026***(0.007)
General petty corruption exposure in t-1 1.325***(0.143) 0.708 (0.840)
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Region FE No No Yes Yes
N 29,554 29,554 29,554 29,554
Pseudo-R2 0.0416 0.0416 0.0818 0.0818
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale. All speciﬁcations include socio-demographic covariates, which control for gender, age, education, poverty, living in urban
areas, and being self-employed. The sample consists of those 22 countries included in round 4 and 5. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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1
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Controlling for levels of individual exposure to a bribe-prone environment provides several insights (Table 4): Bribe experience
related to get water/sanitation services or a place in primary school and bribe experience to avoid problems with the police retain their
explanatory power. Moreover, the estimated effects seem to be more pronounced for respondents with higher levels of individual
exposure (access YES). This highlights the importance of local infrastructure or administrative environment. A higher individual
likelihood to be exposed to bribe extraction, i.e. having more direct access to a certain facility, does not mitigate the adverse ramiﬁ-
cations with respect to tax morale. Instead, individuals react more sensitively to potential bribe extractions in their sphere of interest
than they do in a generally more bribe-prone environment (as indicated by the positive gradient in Fig. 3).5.2. Persistence of corruption
So far, we used cross-sectional data from round 5 of the Afrobarometer (2016). However, cross-sectional data only provide the
opportunity to capture effects at a speciﬁc point in time, i.e. the most recent corruption experience or exposure. Corruption within public
authorities typically has its roots in historical conditions (Blundo et al., 2006) and extortion of bribes is a repeated phenomenon rather
than a single event (Cho and Kirwin, 2007). Thus, it is of importance to analyse whether the estimated difference of the impact from
petty corruption on tax morale is related to earlier periods in time and whether the estimated pattern holds if smaller units of national
areas are considered.
Analysing preceding effects from petty corruption on tax morale with Afrobarometer data is restricted by several constraints. First,
the Afrobarometer started in round 2 asking questions on incidences of petty corruption. However, the questions vary over subsequent
rounds, including different numbers of questions and types of public services. Second, the Afrobarometer asks about the justiﬁability of
cheating on taxes, i.e. our tax morale measure, only in round 5 and does not follow the same individuals over different points in time.
Nevertheless, past levels of corruption exposure might be informative with respect to present levels of tax morale. They might be
informative, e.g. with respect to institutional quality or habituation over time. Their omission might thus have biased our baseline
results. To address this concern, we re-estimate our baseline model accounting for country and regional levels of corruption exposure in
Round 4 (CEt1) based on the following equation:
PðΤ i ¼ highÞ ¼ Φ

β0Corruptioni þ βtjCorruptioni  CEi;t1 þ δtjCEi;t1 þ γXi þ τi

(4)
To minimise the impact of a decreasing or selective sample, i.e. consisting of those countries featuring more reliable institutions, we
do not include data from rounds with much fewer countries participating.9 Table 5 documents the results for those 22 countries included
in round 4 and 5.
The estimated effects of individual bribe experience in the reduced sample (29,554 observations, column 1 in Table 5) are highly
comparable to the results in the baseline speciﬁcationwith country-level FE. The effect's magnitude in the region-level FE speciﬁcation is
somewhat diminished, but overall still comparable to the results from Table 1. In both cases, the inclusion of past levels of exposure to
corruption does not alter the ﬁndings with respect to the impact of individual bribe experience. A one percentage point higher past
general exposure to corruption on the country level, however, is indicative of a 1.3 percentage point lower likelihood of a respondent
displaying a high level of tax morale.
In order to investigate the robustness of our baseline results across time, i.e. in order to determine whether we detect some general
patterns or something speciﬁc to round 5, we construct a Pseudo-Panel based on stable cohorts (Deaton, 1985). The cohorts are deﬁned9 Earlier rounds with fewer countries lack representativeness for the sub-continent because the sample consisted of mostly open, reform-oriented governments (Little
and Logan, 2009).
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Table 6
Tax morale and corruption experience in a Pseudo-Panel approach.
Linear probability models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Petty corruption experience 0.153***
(0.050)
0.187***
(0.059)
0.206***
(0.067)
0.256***
(0.075)
0.256***
(0.086)
Number of domains with bribe experience
One 0.027 (0.129)
Two 0.424**(0.195)
Three 0.240 (0.203)
Highest bribe frequency in any of the three persistent domains
Once or twice 0.348***(0.127)
A few times 0.028 (0.173)
Often 0.281 (0.204)
Separate cohort FE Yes Yes No No No No No
Complete set of cohort FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analytical weights No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Restricted to round 2 countries No No No No No No Yes
Number of cohorts 486 486 432 432 432 432 336
R2 (adjusted) 0.582 0.613 0.507 0.526 0.514 0.513 0.447
Notes: The binary dependent variable is based on the level of agreement to a statement relating to the obligation to pay taxes (tax legitimacy). Socio-demographic
covariates include in addition to the average poverty indicator the following cohort-speciﬁc shares: medium/high education, part-time/full-time employment, urban
residence. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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morale is now assessed based on the item (tax legitimacy) referring to whether individuals see the enforcement of tax payments as
legitimate (T* ¼ 1) or not (T* ¼ 0). For each cohort, we calculate an average of corruption experience and other socio-demographic
variables, denoted as X. Eventually, we estimate a linear probability model of the cohort-speciﬁc average probability of displaying a
high tax morale based on the following equation11:
P

Τ*c;a;g;t ¼ high

¼ βCorruptionc;a;g;t þ γXc;a;g;t þ τc;a;g þ τt (5)
Time trends are absorbed by τt , whereas τc;a;g represents two speciﬁcations of cohort ﬁxed effects. One integrates separate FE by
country (τc), age group (τa) and gender (τg). The other is the complete set of cohort FE (τc;a;g). Analogously to section 4, we account for
the average petty corruption experience in a cohort, the average spread of corruption (the share of individuals with a corruption
experience in zero, one, two or three domains) and the cohort-speciﬁc frequency of bribe experience (the share of respondents who did
experience corruption never, once or twice, a few times or often) in any of these three domains. The restriction to three domains ac-
counts for the changing number (and domain) of bribe-related items over time. We integrate only those domains included in all four
rounds (bribes to get documents, avoid problems with the police or to get household services/sanitation).
Referring to the ﬁrst four columns in Table 6, the reported estimates have the following interpretation: if the cohort-speciﬁc share of
individuals with petty corruption increases by one percentage point, the share of cohort-speciﬁc individuals displaying a high tax morale
declines by 0.15–0.26 percentage points. Applying the complete set of cohort ﬁxed effects, or implementing analytical weights, typically
results in estimates which are larger in absolute size.
With respect to the spread of corruption we see a consistent picture, yet obtain signiﬁcant estimates only for the second highest
spread level. In case of corruption frequency, a one percentage point increasing share of individuals with moderate bribe experience
(only once or twice in any domain) is associated with a 0.35 percentage point decline in the share of individuals with displaying a high
level of tax morale. Since we observe an increase in average cohort tax morale over the years (from 68.8% to 73.1%), we cannot rule out
that our results might be driven by compositional effects. We therefore restrict our model to those 14 countries which were included in
all four rounds (Table 6, column 7). Our ﬁndings remain robust.5.3. Heterogeneity related to civic participation and access to public services
Paying taxes amounts to contributing to the provision of public services. In this regard, individuals' tax morale might be inﬂuenced
by their perception of the tax system's fairness and the availability of public services (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Feld and Frey, 2007).
In this section, we investigate how corruption experience may affect tax morale in heterogeneous ways, depending on the level of10 In each round we have a number of cohorts equal to six times the number of included countries. The number of countries in rounds 2 to 5 is 14, 18, 20 and 29,
respectively. We refrain from introducing more cohorts in order to maintain reasonable cohort sizes. The 10th percentile amounts to a cohort size of 72; the minimum is
19 and the maximum 757. We address the variation in group size by applying cohort weights as robustness check. The age cohorts refer to young adults (18–25 years),
prime-working age individuals (26–50 years) and elderly (above 50 years).
11 We chose the linear probability model in order to apply analytical weights. These weights can account for cohort-size differentials, which relate to the variance of
cohort-speciﬁc averages.
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Table 7
The inﬂuence of participation and access – AMEs of corruption experience for various subgroups.
Participation Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regular news via
Newspaper Yes 0.043***(0.011)
No 0.029***(0.007)
Radio Yes 0.032***(0.006)
No 0.037***(0.014)
TV Yes 0.046***(0.008)
No 0.020**(0.008) y
Country is a democracy No 0.027*(0.017)
Yes, with major problems 0.009 (0.010)
Yes, with minor problems 0.035***(0.009)
Yes, a full democracy 0.058***(0.013)
Ethnic group treated unfairly Never 0.027***(0.008)
Sometimes 0.027**(0.012)
Often 0.047***(0.013)
Sharing country's main religion Yes 0.066***(0.009)
No 0.013*(0.007)y
Socio-demogr. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 39,326 37,916 36,001 39,561
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.046
Note: Table reports average marginal effects of experienced petty corruption by group, e.g. getting regular news via newspaper. The symbol y indicates signiﬁcant effect
differences at the conventional levels. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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introducing interactions with various participation and access measures (PA):
PðΤ i ¼ highÞ ¼ Φ
 
β0Corruptioni þ
XJ
j¼1
βjCorruptioni  PAi;j þ
XJ
j¼1
δjPAi;j þ γXi þ τi
!
(6)
First, we ask whether individuals displaying different information procurement strategies feature differing sensitivities with respect
to corruption experience. Individuals interested in being informed, e.g. regarding government (spending) activities, and thus possibly
also participating in public discourse, might react more sensitively to bribe extortions by ofﬁcials. We therefore construct three binary
information procurement variables, each indicating whether someone gets regular news (at least several times a month) from news-
papers, the radio or TV.12
In a second participation speciﬁcation we account for individuals' perception of how democratic their country is organised. In this
regard, the perceived level of democracymight be an important omitted variable: larger democratic accountability is related to higher tax
morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007) and a more pronounced democratic accountability might make ofﬁcials less likely to extort bribes.
We also estimate the relevance of possible access to public services by following two main lines of thought: Members of minorities
might be (partially) excluded from some public services, which might lower their willingness to contribute via taxes. Vulnerable mi-
norities could also face more frequent attempts of bribe extractions. This aspect is modelled based on a variable which reﬂects the
frequency a respondent thinks his or her ethnic group is treated unfairly. In addition to ethnic discrimination we also account for
discrimination based on religious grounds, by introducing a variable indicating membership of the majority religion. In this regard, Xin
Li (2010) demonstrates that ethnic identity, measured by language, religion and ethnic group status, shapes tax morale.
Table 7 reports the average marginal effects for various subgroups. Individuals acquiring news regularly via TV react more sensi-
tively to bribe experiences (4.6 percentage points reduced likelihood of having a high tax morale) than those getting news infrequently
from TV (2 percentage points). This difference is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. There is also some evidence that individuals who perceive
their country to be fairly democratic react stronger to bribe extractions by ofﬁcials (column 2). Individuals who experience frequent
(rare or no) unfair treatment of the own ethnic group are 4.7 (2.7) percentage points more likely to have a low tax morale. Distinguishing
respondents by whether they share the country's main faith or not yields, at ﬁrst glance, a surprising result: those being part of the
majority, display signiﬁcantly stronger effects (6.6 percentage points) than those being member of a minority religion (1.3 per-
centage points). This ﬁnding can be reconciled, considering that minorities might anticipate to face less lenient authorities in case of
committing a misdemeanour, and thus, display a lower decrease of tax morale.
Overall, our ﬁndings point to the relevance of individual levels of (civic) participation and access possibilities to publicly provided
services. Although individual bribe experiences seem to be consistently associated with lower levels of tax morale, the severity of such
an experience is related to socio-cultural integration.12 We also applied different frequency thresholds, i.e. daily news consumption. The results remain highly comparable.
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Table 8
Tax morale and conﬁdence in tax authorities.
(1) (2)
Trust in tax department
Somewhat 0.0632*** (0.0075)
Just a little 0.0871*** (0.0075)
Not at all 0.1114*** (0.0080)
Perceived number of corrupt tax ofﬁcials
Some of them 0.0338*** (0.0087)
Most of them 0.0565*** (0.0094)
All of them 0.0986*** (0.0110)
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
N 36,560 34,964
Pseudo R2 0.0486 0.0466
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p< 0.01.
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In this section we examine a mechanism how experienced petty corruption will eventually translate into declining tax moral. First,
we provide evidence that trust in tax authorities is related to tax morale. In a next step, we apply a mediation analysis and demonstrate
that petty corruption can inﬂuence tax morale directly and indirectly, i.e. via decreasing conﬁdence in tax authorities.
6.1. Tax morale and conﬁdence in tax authorities
This section takes a closer look at the inﬂuence of the perception of the tax administration on tax morale. The Afrobarometer survey
provides no information about actual bribe experiences of individuals with tax ofﬁcials. However, the survey asks questions regarding
trust in several governmental institutions. Among them, the survey asks how much the respondents trust in the tax department. Re-
spondents could choose between not at all, just a little, somewhat, or a lot. Additionally, the survey asks the respondents how many tax
ofﬁcials they think are involved in corruption and provides the answers: none, some of them, most of them, all of them. We use these
questions as proxies to estimate the effect of conﬁdence in tax authorities on tax morale.
The average marginal effects presented in Table 8 indicate that the two proxies for the impact of conﬁdence in tax authorities on tax
morale are of high statistical signiﬁcance. A decrease of trust in the tax department (e.g. from trusting the tax department a lot to
somewhat) reduces the probability of having the highest level of tax morale by 6.3 percentage points. If respondents perceive that more
tax ofﬁcials might be involved in corruption (e.g. going from none to some of them) the probability of displaying the highest level of tax
morale decreases by 3.4 percentage points.
6.2. Mediated and direct effects
To understand the ways in which petty corruption affects tax morale, it is important to identify the extent to which speciﬁc channels
determine this relationship. The estimation results presented so far indicate that both corruption experiences (Sections 4 & 5) and
conﬁdence in tax authorities (Section 6.1) are signiﬁcantly correlated with tax morale. These ﬁndings can be linked, assuming that
corruption experiences with public services would also affect trust in other public institutions, such as the tax administration. Corruption
experiences may then not only have direct effects but also indirect effects on tax morale, mediated through reduced levels of conﬁdence
in the tax authorities.
A mediation analysis facilitates the partitioning of a total effect into direct and indirect effects. Appendix Fig. A1 illustrates the
underlying scheme of the mediation analysis used. We analyse the composition of the total effect (β) that results from the effect of the
petty corruption experience (corruption), on tax morale (T). Petty corruption has a direct effect (βD) on tax morale and an indirect effect
(βI) via the mediator (Mj), conﬁdence in tax authorities. In the mediation analysis, we transformed the ordinal mediator variables into
binary variables, indicating low trust in the tax department and the perception of most tax ofﬁcials being corrupt. Themediating effect of
both measures of conﬁdence in tax authorities is captured in the indirect effect. Eventually, the mediation analysis relies on three single
equations which are partially interrelated in the form of a structural equation model:
PðΤ i ¼ highÞ ¼ ΦðβCorruptioni þ γXi þ τiÞ (7.1)
PðΤ i ¼ highÞ ¼ Φ

βDCorruptioni þ βwMi;j þ γXi þ τi

(7.2)
P

Mi;j ¼ high
 ¼ ΦβMCorruptioni þ γXi þ τi (7.3)
Equation (7.1) corresponds to our baseline speciﬁcation, providing a coefﬁcient estimate related to the total effect. From equation
(7.2) we may retrieve the direct effect βD and the ﬁrst component (βw) required to obtain the indirect (mediated) effect of corruption12
Table 9
Binary mediation analysis.
(1) M1: Trust in tax department (2) M2: Corrupt tax ofﬁcials
Bootstrap sample estimates of the
Total effect of corruption on tax morale (β) 0.0330 [-0.0445 -0.0210] 0.0334 [-0.0448 -0.0212]
Direct effect of corruption on tax moral (βD) 0.0300 [-0.0419 -0.0180] 0.0295 [-0.0414 -0.0174]
Indirect (mediated) effect (βI ) 0.0029 [-0.0038 -0.0020] 0.0039 [-0.0051 -0.0027]
% of total effect mediated 0.0868 [0.0646 0.1371] 0.1154 [0.0866 0.1825]
In-sample average marginal effects of
βW 0.0829***(0.0069) 0.0395***(0.0056)
βM 0.0379***(0.0048) 0.0921***(0.0061)
Socio-demographic controls YES YES
Country FE YES YES
N 32,939 32,939
Notes: Reported 95% conﬁdence intervals (in square brackets) are based on a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications. In-sample AMEs refer to the effects of cor-
ruption on a mediator (βM ) and the effect of a mediator on tax morale (βW ) in the real-world sample, based on robust standard errors (reported in parentheses). Sig-
niﬁcance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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corruption. Eventually, the indirect effect βI is a rescaled combination of the two.13 In all equations we control for the potentially
confounding factors, known from our baseline model.
Drawing upon the algorithm by Hicks and Tingley (2011), we estimate the equations from the depicted structural model. In order to
quantify the relevance of any detected indirect (mediated) effect, we derive 95% conﬁdence intervals based on a bootstrap procedure
with 1000 replications. Table 9 presents the average total effect, the average direct effect and the average mediated effect across the
1000 replication samples and the related conﬁdence intervals.
Having paid bribes reduces the probability of having the highest level of tax morale by 3.3 percentage points in the slightly reduced
mediation analysis sample (3.2 percentage points in the full baseline sample). Based on the 95% conﬁdence intervals we can detect
signiﬁcant indirect effects: By lowering trust in the tax department, corruption experiences exert a mediated effect of 0.29 percentage
points on tax morale. This amounts to 9 per cent of the total effect. The indirect effect is more pronounced in case of the mediator
relating to the perception of corruption amongst tax ofﬁcials – the mediated affect accounts for 11 per cent of the total effect, and thus, a
corruption experience lowers tax morale indirectly by 0.39 percentage points.
While these ﬁndings point to the existence of signiﬁcant indirect effects, via a diminished conﬁdence in tax authorities, their relative
size indicates that the harmful effect of corruption experience operates on a more general level: paying bribes seems to erode the
willingness to contribute to the funding of public services directly. In other words, the damage done by corrupt ofﬁcials in general can
hardly be undone by immaculate tax authorities.
7. Conclusion
This paper delivers micro-level evidence that petty corruption payments signiﬁcantly reduce taxmorale of citizens in 29 Sub-Saharan
countries. Moreover, we provide compelling evidence of a non-monotonic relationship of the prevalence of corruption and tax morale.
Individuals with intermediate corruption experiences display the strongest sensitivity: they are 5–7 percentage points less likely to
exhibit high levels of taxmorale. Separating the potential effects by the respective domain corruption is encountered in, we ﬁnd themost
pronounced harmful effects for corruption experiences in a situation with direct representatives of the government, i.e. the police.
We also uncovered a notable degree of heterogeneity, i.e. with respect to civic participation and potential access to public services.
Potential tax payers who are better informed, e.g. consume news on a regular basis, react much more sensitively to petty corruption
experience. The same can be observed for those who perceive that their ethnic group is often treated unfairly. In this case, a lower tax
morale in case of facing bribe extortion can be interpreted as a form of negative reciprocity.
Our analyses demonstrate further that there is no complete habituation to corruption experience. Individuals living in an institu-
tional setting where corruption is most prevalent still display a diminished tax morale once being extorted a bribe payment. It is,
however, not only the abstract perception of corruption prevalence on the country- or regional-level that matters, but also the
individual-level risk of encountering a corrupt ofﬁcial in the local sphere of interest, i.e. the daily life. We also investigate to which
extent petty corruption and conﬁdence in institutions, i.e. tax authorities, may jointly impact on tax morale. Approximately 10 per cent
of the total effect observed is an indirect effect, e.g. attributable to a reduced conﬁdence in tax authorities as a consequence of petty
corruption experience. This implies, eventually, that the adverse consequences of petty corruption do not solely affect conﬁdence in
institutions but undermine the willingness to contribute in general.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the goal of national governments to ensure their citizens pay taxes. A highly robust
and mostly non-monotonic relationship of petty corruption and tax morale indicates that, especially, well informed individuals living in
an institutional environment characterised by intermediate levels of petty corruption are most prone to refuse to pay taxes. Countries13 In case equations (7.2) and (7.3) are estimated as linear models, the indirect effect could be directly retrieved as βI ¼ βwβM .
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reliability of their institutions. Once petty corruption is normalised, the ﬁscal returns to the implementation of anti-corruption policies
might not outweigh the related politico-economic costs.
The importance of petty corruption regarding citizens' attitudes towards tax payments urge more research in this direction. It would
be insightful to investigate the interrelation of bribe amounts and accounts of individual tax payments. Furthermore, a more detailed
elicitation of corruption domains would enable more reﬁned analyses: For one, related to the limited number of domains in the
Afrobarometer, the actual extent of individuals with corruption experiences might be notably underestimated. In addition, analysing
which types of a wider range of corruption experiences may cause the strongest reactions would be helpful in terms of inferring
appropriate policy recommendations in order to enhance tax morale and tax compliance.
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Appendix
Table A1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Short description Mean/ Min Max N14shareSocio-demographic controls
Female 0: no, 1: yes 0.50 0 1 45,598
Age in years 37.09 18 105 45,183
Education 0: low 0.53 0 2 45,5091: medium 0.42
2: high 0.06Self-employed 0: no, 1: yes 0.50 0 1 43,560
Urban residence 0: no, 1: yes 0.37 0 1 44,911
Poverty index based on deprivation in the domains: food, water, medical care, cooking
fuel, and cash income
0.00 2.68 2.02 45,023Tax morale (not paying taxes is …) 0: not wrong at all 0.12 0 2 42,974
1: wrong but understandable 0.38
2: wrong and punishable 0.50Tax morale (high) 1: yes 0.50 0 1 42,974
Tax legitimacy 1: enforcing tax payments is legitimate 0.73 0 1 43,581
Corruption
Petty corruption experience 0: no, 1: yes 0.30 0 1 44,834
Domain-spec. corruption experience
Get document or permit 0: no, 1: yes 0.16 0 1 45,358
Get water/sanitation service 0: no, 1: yes 0.08 0 1 45,266
Get health treatment 0: no, 1: yes 0.15 0 1 45,388
Avoid problem with police 0: no, 1: yes 0.14 0 1 45,307
Get place in primary school 0: no, 1: yes 0.10 0 1 45,355Spread of corruption (across the ﬁve
domains)0.62 0 5 45,511Corruption frequency (maximum, across
all domain)0: never 0.70 0 3 45,511
1: once or twice 0.13
2: a few times 0.09
3: often 0.08General corruption exposure per country avg. corr. exper. in a country 0.30 0.04 0.64 45,598
General corruption exposure per region avg. corr. exper. in a region 0.30 0.00 0.84 45,598
General corruption exposure (t  1) avg. corr. exper. in a country in round 4 0.22 0.03 0.40 34,537
Individual exposure/access to
Piped water 0: no, 1: yes 0.52 0 1 45,518(continued on next page)
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shareMin Max NSewage system 0: no, 1: yes 0.24 0 1 45,227
Health clinic 0: no, 1: yes 0.59 0 1 45,387
Police station 0: no, 1: yes 0.35 0 1 45,398
Roadblock 0: no, 1: yes 0.05 0 1 45,598
School 0: no, 1: yes 0.88 0 1 45,470Regular news via
Newspaper 0: no, 1: yes 0.29 0 1 45,340
Radio 0: no, 1: yes 0.80 0 1 45,557
TV 0: no, 1: yes 0.49 0 1 45,484Country is a democracy 0: not a democracy 0.09 1 4 42,834
1: democracy with major problems 0.31
2: democracy with minor problems 0.39
3: full democracy 0.21Ethnic group treated unfairly 0: never 0.60 0 2 41,150
1: sometimes 0.22
2: often 0.18Sharing country's main religion 0: no, 1: yes 0.37 0 1 45,598
Conﬁdence in tax authorities
Trust in tax department 0: not at all 0.22 0 3 40,3711: just a little 0.29
2: somewhat 0.27
3: a lot 0.22Perceived no. of corrupt tax ofﬁcials 0: none 0.12 0 3 38,366
1: some of them 0.46
2: most of them 0.29
3: all of them 0.13Note: In case of categorical variables the shares of the respective categories are reported instead of the overall mean.
Fig. A1. Graphical representation of the mediation analysis.
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